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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - BORDER SEARCHES -
EXTRACTIONS FROM BODY
Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
The reasonableness of searches to extract evidence from within
the body poses a difficult judicial question. This is particularly
true of border searches which involve the recovery of contraband
concealed within the various body cavities.
In Blefare v. United States,' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
was confronted with this very question when it reviewed a con-
viction for the illegal importation of narcotics which was based on
evidence obtained by scientifically compelling the defendant to re-
gurgitate. The pertinent facts of the case are as follows. Federal
agents learned that Blefare had admitted smuggling heroin into the
United States and that he was presently in Mexico. Various ports
of entry along the Mexican border were alerted, and three weeks
later customs agents stopped Blefare and a companion attempting
to cross the border. After the men were taken to a search room
and disrobed, narcotics agents noticed needle marks on the arms of
both men and subsequently accused them of carrying narcotics in
their stomachs or rectums. Both men denied this, stating that they
would not object to being examined by a doctor, although no indi-
cation was given as to the nature or the extent of the proposed
examination. They were then taken twelve miles from the border
where a doctor administered a rectal probe on each without result.
But after a saline solution was given to induce vomiting, Blefare
was seen to have vomited and re-swallowed an object. At this
point the doctor attempted to insert a plastic tube containing an
emetic through Blefare's nose, down his throat, and into his stom-
ach. When Blefare objected to this, three agents held him still,
and the doctor inserted the tube. Within a few seconds, Blefare
vomited two packets of heroin.'
At trial the doctor testified that the packets had been obtained
in a medically approved manner, alternatives to the method used
having been rejected as being less sound. The doctor also testified
that, had the packets not been removed, Blefare might have died
within a short time because the gastric juices of his stomach would
have destroyed the heroin's rubber covering. Blefare testified that
he intended to remove the heroin by self-induced vomiting.'
1362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
2 Id. at 871-73.
SId. at 872-74.
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On appeal the defendant contended that the heroin packets
were seized in violation of the fourth amendment and were thus
inadmissible as evidence at trial.4 The circuit court considered two
main issues: whether the detention of the defendant was incident
to a border search and whether the subsequent recovery of the
packets from the defendant's stomach was a reasonable search and
seizure.'
In order to fully understand the reasoning employed by the
court in affirming the conviction and holding the recovery of the
packets to be incident to a reasonable border search, it should be
recalled that border searches have long been considered sui generis."
No probable cause is needed to search those entering the country;7
mere suspicion on the part of a customs agent is sufficient.8 The
United States Supreme Court has analyzed the basis for this dis-
tinction:
The two [searches] ... differ toto ccelo. In the one case, the gov-
ernment is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other
it is not.... [T]he seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the
revenue laws ... has been authorized by ... our own revenue acts
from the commencement of the government. 9
Although border searches may be made on mere suspicion, they
must be conducted in a reasonable manner.'" In this respect alone
are they similar to ordinary searches.'1
Authorization for border searches by customs agents upon mere
suspicion is set forth specifically by statute.'2 This authorization
4Id. at 871.
5 Id. at 874.
6 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Taylor v. United States, 352
F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1965); Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 936 (1964); Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962);
Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961);
Barrera v. United States, 276 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1960).
7 See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, supra note 6; King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814
(9th Cir. 1965); Bible v. United States, 314 F.2d 106 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
862 (1963); Denton v. United States, supra note 6; Witt v. United States, supra note 6;
Ramirez v. United States, 263 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1959).
8 Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961);
Cervantes v. United States, 363 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1959) (dictum). See note 12
infra.
9 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
10 Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1965); Lane v. United States,
321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963).
11 Ibid.
12 14 Star. 178 (1886), 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1964), which provides that any customs
officer may, on mere suspicion, search any person or vehicle entering the United
States.
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continues until there has been a complete entry, 3 for a party must
not only cross the border but also become a part of the interior
of the United States.'4 The circumstances of the entry and not
the distance from the border thus appear to govern the suscepti-
bility of a party to a border search.
In Blefare the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions
all found the heroin packets to be the product of a border search. 5
What occurred twelve miles from the border was incidental to the
initial detention of the defendant at the port of entry.'" A com-
plete entry had never been effected.
Since the court found this to be a border search, the remaining
question to be considered was the reasonableness of the means em-
ployed to compel the defendant to vomit the two packets of heroin.17
The leading case concerning the reasonableness of a search to
recover contraband concealed within the body cavities is Rochin v.
California.'8 In that case, police went to the dwelling house of
the defendant and forced open the door to his room. Upon enter-
ing they saw him push two capsules into his mouth, and after
unsuccessfully attempting to extract these capsules, the police took
the defendant to a hospital where a doctor forced a tube down
his throat to induce vomiting. Two morphine capsules were ex-
pelled and used as evidence. In reversing the conviction and con-
demning the entire procedure as "conduct that shocks the con-
science"'9 the Supreme Court stated:
Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle
to open up his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible
extraction of his stomach's contents - this course of proceeding
by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend
'. United States v. Yee Ngee How, 105 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Cal. 1952):
A"completed entry" is claimed by petitioner by virtue of the fact that he
was allowed to leave the ship and enter San Francisco on the day previous
to this search. Had the petitioner or his possessions been searched while he
was off the ship and within the city, the situation would have been different;
but this was not done. Once petitioner returned to the ship on which were
located his living quarters, and where his baggage had been left, he recrossed
the barrier. When he again left the ship... he was, for the purposes of
customs inspection, a person coming into the United States .... Id. at
522-23.
14 Ibid.
'5 362 F.2d at 874, 880-81.
1' Id. at 874.
17 Id. at 874, 880.
18 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
'1 Id. at 172.
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even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the
rack and the screw .... 20
In only two other cases has the Supreme Court considered the
reasonableness of searches to extract evidence from within the body.
In Breithaupt v. Abram,2 ' decided after Rochin, the Court held that
the extraction of a sample of blood for a test was not analogous
to Rochin so as to "shock the conscience."22  In Schmerber v.
California," the Court has recently affirmed its decision in Brei-
thaupt with respect to .the extraction of a blood sample.'
Before Rochin the lower courts had held, with few exceptions, 25
that nonconsensual searches of a suspect's rectum or stomach to re-
cover narcotics were reasonable, and despite the Rochin decision,
lower courts have continued 'to uphold the reasonableness of these
procedures with respect to both border and general searches.2 ' The
most important of these cases decided after Rochin was Blackford
v. United States, 7 wherein narcotics were recovered by means of a
rectal probe. The court distinguished Rochin by stressing the lack
of aggravating circumstances and the fact that this type of examina-
tion was medically proper and was painless except when the defend-
ant refused to cooperate. The search was therefore held to be
reasonable. 8  Since Blackford, the lower federal courts have con-
tinually upheld the reasonableness of such searches'
In Blefare the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions
drew varying conclusions from an analysis of these background
cases. The majority opinion relied heavily on federal appellate
decisions which had upheld the reasonableness of rectal probes and
the use of emetics to induce vomiting."c It was emphasized that,
20 Ibid.
21 352 U.s. 432 (1957).
221d. at 436-37.
23 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
24 Ibid.
2 1 United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
2 6 See, e.g., Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963) (stomach); Denton
v. United States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962) (rectum); Barrera v. United States,
276 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1960) (stomach); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 946 (1964) (rectum); Blackford v. United States,
247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958) (rectum).
27 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958).
2 8 Ibid.
29 See Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963); Denton v. United
States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962); Barrera v. United States, 276 F.2d 654 (5th
Cir. 1960); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 946 (1964).
30 Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1966).
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as distinguished from Rochin, here there was no illegal entry into
the defendant's home; no brutality was involved; and the vomiting
was induced through the best possible scientific methods. 1 The
majority, citing Blackford v. United States"2 which also distin-
guished Rochin on these grounds, found that it was the circum-
stances which led up to the compelled regurgitation and not the
vomiting itself that shocked the Court in Rochin.3 The court
stressed that in the instant case the vomiting had been effected
through proper medical procedure. 4 It found the search to be
reasonable and sustained the conviction."s
The concurring opinion sought to further distinguish Rochin
by citing Breithaupt v. Abram6 to support its contention that the
Rochin Court considered the means employed rather than the actual
regurgitation of evidence to be the controlling factor as to the
reasonableness of the search- 
7
The dissenting judge found the procedure utilized in Blefare
to be shocking and unreasonable.3" He emphasized that none of
the Fifth or Ninth Circuit decisions cited by the majority were
controlling because none had involved the forcing of a tube down
the nose of a suspect and into his stomach."9 It was further as-
serted that Rochin could not be distinguished, for the only signifi-
cant factual difference in the two cases was said to be that in
Rochin a tube was inserted into the defendant's mouth, whereas
in the instant case it was inserted into the defendant's nose 0 The
81Id. at 875-76.
82 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cit. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958).
23 362 F.2d at 875-76.
34 Id. at 876.
85 ibid.
36 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
-7 362 F.2d at 876.
881d. at 880.
39 Id. at 881 n.1 (dissenting opinion).
4 0 Id. at 881-82 n.2 (dissenting opinion).
The process did not involve the use of a pump in the sense of a mechanical
device for the forcible propulsion of liquid-, hence, the majority opinion care-
fully emphasizes, "There was no pump."
A similar method of gravitational flow of an emetic through a tube was
under consideration in Rochin .... There, however, there was less abusive
variation, inasmuch as the tube was placed through the mouth of the victim
rather than being forced through the nostrils as here. Nevertheless, the Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court have repeatedly referred to the process as "stomach
pumping" . . . . Ibid.
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dissent found that in Rochin it was the extreme bodily intrusion
itself that shocked the Court"
The dissenting opinion recognized the practical dilemma pres-
ent in this case. It conceded that the concern for effective border
control of narcotics smuggling appeared to give customs authorities
no workable alternative. But the dissent was nonetheless appalled
at the ramifications of the majority opinion:
Holding it to be so now vests in all border officials... abso-
lute... discretion to engage in such drastic search procedure upon
what might be shown to have been the merest whim .... [S]uspi-
cion alone might legally justify the "stomach pumping" . . . of
any ... alien or citizen ....
Is there another available avenue which is bounded by due
regard for both the public's interest and the individual's right? I
believe that there is ..... 4
The dissent proceeded to point out that the instant search had
progressed beyond that of a traditional border inquiry and had be-
come one incident to a border arrest. The policy considerations
for exempting border searches from normal search and seizure requi-
sites thus became less relevant, while at the same time concern
for the rights and dignity of the suspect should have been intensi-
fied.4" To accomplish this end the dissent proposed that authorities
be required to obtain warrants before such severe and accusatory
searches into the body are made: "That customs officials should
seek judicial authorization, where time permits, before engaging in
extremely unusual invasions of the human body would appear to
be a wholly reasonable requirement ...which would protect the
constitutional rights of individuals .... and not significantly thwart
.regulation of border traffic."44  It should be noted that the dis-
sent did not rule out the possibility that a warrant could have au-
thorized the mode of search employed in the instant case so as to
have made it reasonable.4
5
41 Id. at 882-83.
I cannot believe that in Rochin the Supreme Court was shocked by the
fact that ... the officers were in the dwelling wrongfully or that they had
forced their way into Rochin's room. Such procedures may be improper, but
they are quite frequently followed by well meaning police officers ....
Surely, they are not... "methods too dose to the rack and screw." Ibid.
421d. at 886.
43Id. at 884 (dissenting opinion).
441d. at 888.
45 Id. at 887. "It is not untreasonable to assume that a magistrate might have
agreed that, in the absence of feasible alternatives ... the use of the stomach tube...
would not have constituted unreasonable intrusion." Ibid.
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The present state of the law with respect to the issues presented
in Blefare remains in doubt. The majority opinion appears to
have distinguished Rochin to the point of insignificance.46 The
plain meaning of the words in Rochin and the recognition that,
at the time this opinion was handed down, the Supreme Court
had not yet bound the states to apply the exclusionary rule makes
it extremely difficult to accept the conclusion of the majority in
Blefare that illegal entry, manhandling, or anything short of forced
extraction of evidence from the stomach of Rochin had shocked
the Court Also, there is no suggestion in Rochin that the Court
held the search shocking because of improper medical procedure.
On the contrary, there is every indication that the procedure was
medically sound.47 Thus, the assertion that so much of the majority
and concurring opinions was based upon the proper use of the
emetic is a non sequitur. Moreover, the Blefare opinions stressed
that the authorities had no practical alternative, yet this is exactly
what the police had asserted in Rochin 8
Finally, as was discussed earlier,49 the majority opinion paral-
lels Blackford v. United States,5" which distinguished Rochin in
exactly the same manner. The rationale of Blackford in distin-
guishing Rochin has been questioned. As has been stated: "Inher-
ent... throughout the opinion, there is a pragmatic approach to
the case which goes farther to justifying the decision then tsi the
legal acrobatics used to define the law."5  Another writer has con-
cluded that the "Court would seemingly reject the reasoning of
[Blackford] . . . for although forcibly removing narcotics from
one's rectum may not be as brutal as pumping out one's stomach,
it is certainly more shocking to the conscience."5
The suggestion in the Blefare dissent that searches which in-
vade the body must be made pursuant to a warrant whenever pos-
4 6 See 9 LOYOLA L. REv. 130, 132 (1958). There it is suggested that the Blackford
decision (followed by the court in Blefare) would have made the search of Rochin a
reasonable one. Both the Blefare and Blackford decisions are based on the fact that
the procedure employed was medically proper. Yet there is every reason to believe
that the procedure in Rochin was medically proper.
47 In Rochin the Supreme Court made no reference to any improper medical pro-
cedure. The entire "search" was performed in a hospital by a physician. If the Court
had found the procedure to have been medically improper, it is unlikely that the Court
would have neglected to mention such a relevant fact.
48 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
4 9 See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
50 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958).
5121 GA. B.J. 269, 271 (1959).
529 MERCER L REV. 220,221-22 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
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sible is certainly an imaginative and practical proposal. Although
the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Rabinowitz53 that
the practicality of obtaining a warrant was no longer the sole test
of the reasonableness of a search, it did not reject the question of
practicality as a relevant consideration.54 Furthermore, the recent
Supreme Court decision in Schmerber v. California" recognized
the feasibility of procuring a warrant as a most relevant considera-
tion in determining the reasonableness of invading the body to
extract evidence: "The importance of informed, detached and delib-
erate determination of the issue whether or not to invade another's
body in a search . ..is great."56  In Schmerber the Court con-
cluded that the arrest of the intoxicated driver after an automobile
accident afforded the police no opportunity to obtain a warrant
either before or after the arrest because the amount of alcohol in
the body diminishes shortly after the cessation of drinking."
Schmerber thus supports the dissent's contention that the extreme
intrusion into Blefare's body without a warrant was not justified
since the agents had ample opportunity to present the situation to
an impartial magistrate both before and after the search.5"
Constitutional guarantees should not be interpreted so as to
frustrate effective law enforcement by allowing criminals to conceal
or destroy evidence within their bodies. Nevertheless, one cannot
accept the opinion of the majority in Blefare that the Constitution
permits regurgitation to be compelled by forcing a tube into the
stomach of a suspect merely because the procedure employed was
medically acceptable. This position seems particularly untenable
when applied to border searches, where the law has granted customs
agents almost unlimited discretion. Thus, the dissent's proposed
53 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
54 Id. at 65-66.
55 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
56Id. at 770.
57 Ibid.
58 The Canadian authorities had informed American agents of Blefares operations
three weeks before his arrest. During that entire period customs agents at the Mexican
border had been alerted for Blefare's return from Tiajuana, where he was suspected of
obtaining narcotics. There was thus ample opportunity and probable cause to procure
a warrant before Blefare crossed the border. Likewise, after Blefare had reached the
border at 11:00 p.m., he was taken twelve miles into San Diego to be searched. A
warrant could easily have been obtained there, for the danger of the heroin being lib-
erated in the stomach by gastric juices was reported at trial to have been within a
two-day period. The search was completed approximately two hours after Blefare had
been detained. 362 F.2d at 871-72.
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